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Abstract
Purpose An important assumption underlying the qual-
ity-adjusted life year (QALY) model is that people trade
off life years against health in the same proportion irre-
spective of the number of remaining life years. This is
known as the constant proportional trade-offs (CPTO)
condition. Previous studies have produced mixed empirical
evidence about the validity of CPTO. This paper is the ﬁrst
to test CPTO using the time trade-off (TTO) method for a
broad time horizon.
Methods In a sample of 83 students, we use a choice
based TTO protocol to elicit TTO scores for back pain,
using ten different gauge durations ranging between 1 and
46 years. The TTO scores are corrected for discounting,
which is elicited by means of the direct method.
Results We ﬁnd average TTO scores varying between
0.72 and 0.81. Although the scores do not differ much for
different durations in absolute terms, some differences are
signiﬁcant, rejecting CPTO, with and without correcting
for discounting. No clear relationship between TTO scores
and gauge duration is found. An anchoring and rounding
heuristic to some extent explains our results.
Conclusions Our ﬁndings highlight the importance of
elicitation methods and context dependencies in QALY
measurement and warrant detailed investigation of their
inﬂuence.
Keywords Time trade-off method   Constant
proportional trade-off   Discounting   QALY model
Abbreviations
CPTO Constant proportional trade-offs
EQ-5D EuroQol 5D
MET Maximum endurable time
QALY Quality-adjusted life year
TTO Time trade-off method
Introduction
Health economic evaluations often express health beneﬁts
in terms of health-related utilities. The common utility
model used in these evaluations is the quality-adjusted life
years (QALY) model. The QALY model is popular mainly
because it provides a straightforward way to combine the
two main outcomes of health care interventions, quality of
life, and life duration into a single index measure [1].
Moreover, the QALY model is intuitively appealing [2].
Despite its popularity, the QALY model suffers from
severe criticism. The main objections include empirical
violations of theoretical properties of the QALY model, as
discussed in more detail below.
The importance of QALYs in economic evaluations ren-
ders the proper measurement of QALY tariffs to be crucial.
Thetimetrade-off(TTO)methodisawidelyusedmethodto
elicitthesetariffs[3–5].ThepurposeoftheTTOmethodisto
value health states by letting individuals trade off life years
against healthimprovements. Acommon TTOexerciseasks
arespondenttosupposelivingfor10moreyearsinthehealth
statetobevalued,afterwhichshedies.Therespondent’stask
is then to indicate how many life years she is willing to give
up in order to restore full health.
The properties of the QALY model translate into those
of the TTO method. The descriptive deﬁciencies of the
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several distorting inﬂuences, threatening its suitability to
measure individuals’ true preferences for health. Examples
of factors leading to distortions include administration
mode [6], discounting [7], loss aversion [8, 9], maximum
endurable time (MET) [10, 11], and scale compatibility
[12]. A result of these (and possibly other) factors in TTO
is the empirical falsiﬁcation of constant proportional trade-
offs (CPTO, [13, 14]). This property states that health
valuations obtained by the TTO method, i.e., TTO scores,
should be the same no matter what time horizon is used in
the elicitation process. In other words, individuals are
assumed to trade off a constant proportion of remaining life
duration in order to regain full health, regardless of the
absolute size of that duration. If we, for example, would
replace the 10 years in the example by 1 year, the answer
of the respondent in the second task should be 1/10 of her
answer in the ﬁrst task. If CPTO is violated, the usual
procedure to employ a 10-year time horizon in eliciting
TTO scores and generalizing the results to all durations
will lead to incorrect conclusions. A violation of CPTO
implies that health state valuations are not constant but
depend on their duration and, hence, that the QALY model
is not valid. In that case, it is necessary to detect the causes
of the departure from this model and to seek for modiﬁ-
cations of the model that improve its descriptive validity.
Attema and Brouwer [14] reviewed previous studies of
CPTO and showed that these studies have found negative
or mixed evidence, but normally only considered rather
short time horizons and, therefore, could not make an
inference about the relationship between TTO scores and
duration for a large number of years. The reviewed studies
indicate that TTO scores tend to be high for short dura-
tions, potentially indicating that individuals do not want to
give up many life years when their life expectancy is short.
On the other hand, TTO scores may be higher for longer
durations, because individuals may have some maximum
number of life years they are prepared to sacriﬁce irre-
spective of the life expectancy in the impaired health state.
Based on this reasoning, Attema and Brouwer [14]
hypothesized a U shaped relationship between TTO scores
and gauge duration. However, as CPTO tests had not yet
been performed using a wide variety of gauge durations, no
evidence existed so far that could explicitly test this
hypothesis. Therefore, this paper is the ﬁrst to test CPTO
over a broad range of gauge durations in a within-subjects
setting, both with and without controlling for discounting.
We consider a 50-year time span and elicit TTO scores
for ten different durations within that time span. Moreover,
we correct TTO scores for discounting and investigate the
inﬂuence of this correction on the relationship between
TTO scores and duration. Our procedure is entirely choice
based and, hence, better embedded into economic theory
and the choice-based nature of real-life health decisions
[4].
Methods
This paper uses the notation of Attema and Brouwer [14].
That is, we let h = (hj,…, hT) denote a health proﬁle,
where ht represents the health state in period t = j,…, T,
with T an individual’s ﬁnal period of life. A constant health
proﬁle h = (hj = a,…, hT = a) is described as health
proﬁle a with duration na. The individual’s preferences
over health quality in some period are represented by the
value function v(ht), while d(t) denotes the corresponding
weight attached to the value in this period. If the general-
ized QALY model holds, then preferences for health pro-
ﬁles h = (hj,…, hT) can be evaluated by the following
function [15]:
Uðt;htÞ¼
X T
t¼j 1
dðtÞvðhtÞ: ð1Þ
The term
PT
t¼j 1 dðtÞ is called the utility of life duration
for the period between t = j - 1 and t = T. In the
remainder of this paper, we denote the period between
two time points, e.g., x and y,
Py
t¼x 1 dðtÞ,b yW[x - 1, y].
We suppress the beginning of a period if it is 0 and, hence,
write W(y) instead of W[0, y]. We normalize the utility
function such that W(0) = 0 and W(T) = 1. A concave
utility function for life duration is considered equivalent to
discounting in this paper.
Ordinary CPTO holds if the proportion of remaining life
years that one is willing to give up for an improvement in
health status from any health state b to any health state c
does not depend on the absolute number of remaining life
years [16]. If this is valid, then the utility function of life
duration has to be a power function (with the linear func-
tion as a special case) [16]. This means that there exists a
number q C 0, such that q = nc/nb and individuals are
willing to give up the same proportion (1 - q) of lifetime
irrespective of its duration (nb). In other words, the ratio of
the number of years in c (e.g., full health in most TTO
exercises) to the number of years in b (e.g., back pain)
should be the same no matter what number of years in b is
chosen. One can, therefore, test ordinary CPTO by simply
comparing uncorrected TTO scores, without having to
know the utility of life duration function. If ordinary CPTO
holds, the utility of life duration will be a member of the
power family and v(b) will have the same value irrespec-
tive of the stated period nb.
Attema and Brouwer [14] explained that if ordinary
CPTO is violated for uncorrected TTO scores, it does not
necessarily follow that CPTO for corrected TTO scores
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123(generalized CPTO) is violated as well. Generalized CPTO
means that the proportion of remaining utility of life years,
1 - W(nc)/W(nb), that one is willing to give up for an
improvement in health status from any health state b to any
health state c does not depend on the utility of the absolute
number of remaining life years, W(nb)[ 14]. Then, there
exists a number q C 0 such that q = W(nc)/W(nb) and
individuals are willing to give up the same proportion
(1 - q) of utility of life duration irrespective of its duration
(nb). If generalized CPTO is also violated, this indicates a
falsiﬁcation of the generalized QALY model, whereas a
violation of ordinary CPTO only indicates a violation of
some parametric family of the QALY model (i.e., the
power family).
If we do not make assumptions about utility of life
duration curvature in TTO elicitations, we need more
information before we are able to estimate health state
utilities. Knowledge of the values of the durations in full
health (nFH) and in the impaired health state (nb)i sn o
longer enough, and we have to infer information about the
utility function for life duration. In terms of the generalized
QALY model, an ordinary TTO elicitation gives the fol-
lowing equation:
WðnbÞvðbÞ¼WðnFHÞ: ð2Þ
The values of nb and nFH are known, but in order to get
an estimate of v(b), we also have to elicit W(nb) and
W(nFH).
These elicitations allow us to estimate q without the
discounting bias, and, hence, to test the generalized CPTO
property. Using this approach, the present paper tests the
linear and generalized versions of the QALY model by
performing a test of CPTO both for the absolute number
of life years and for utilities. Some studies have tested
CPTO while correcting for discounting and found both
supporting [10, 16, 17] and rejecting evidence [14, 18].
However, thus far no study has tested (generalized) CPTO
over a broad time horizon. Our study performs this test
and addresses a number of additional questions. First,
does generalized CPTO hold? If not, is there a relation-
ship between TTO scores and gauge durations, like, for
example, a U shape? Finally, what are the implications
for the QALY model?
Experiment
Subjects
The subject pool consisted of 83 business administration
undergraduate students who participated for course
credits.
Procedure
The experiment was administered on computers in the
Erasmus Behavioral Laboratory at Erasmus University
Rotterdam. The experimental sessions were run by one of
the authors with four subjects at a time. The subjects were
separated by partitions, in order to avoid discussion
between them. The sessions lasted 30 min on average.
Both the TTO part and the discounting part were choice
based and used a midpoint technique to elicit indifferences
[19]. Practice questions and repeat choices were included
to test the understanding of the subjects. The repeat ques-
tions consisted of a repetition of the ﬁrst question of a
sequence at the end of that sequence. In case the choice in
the repeat question disagreed with the choice in the original
question, the sequence was elicited anew.
Discounting procedure
We used the risk-free utility of life duration elicitation
method (direct method)[ 19] to elicit the discount weights.
An advantage of this method is that it involves no uncer-
tainty, and therefore, is not subject to distortions such as
violations of expected utility. Another advantage is that the
method is nonparametric, so no, possibly erroneous, para-
metric assumptions (e.g., exponential discounting) have to
made [19]. The subjects’ task in this method is to compare
two different health proﬁles, Proﬁle I and Proﬁle II, each
consisting of two health states: B and G, with G strictly
better than B. In Proﬁle I, the subject gets an immediate
improvement in health from B to G, which lasts until time
point m, after which the subject returns to health state
B until point T: Proﬁle I = (G1,…, Gm,B m?1,…, BT). In
Proﬁle II, he starts in health state B and will be in that
health state until time point m, followed by the health
improvement toward health state G, which lasts until time
point T: Proﬁle II = (B1,…, Bm,G m?1,…, GT). Let us give
an example of the implementation of the direct method by
describing the ﬁrst question. In the ﬁrst question, we set
m = 25, equal to half the value of T (which was set at
50 years, a plausible amount for our sample of students
[average age 20.5 years, SD 2.8]). Proﬁle I was then given
by (G1,…, G25,B 26,…, B50) and Proﬁle II by (B1,…, B25,
G26,…, G50). If the subject preferred I, then the value of
m was lowered; whereas, it was increased if he chose II.
We went on this way until the subject was about indifferent
between I and II. Attema et al. [19] showed that estimates
of W(m) = 1/2 W(T) can be obtained in this way and,
because we normalize W(T) to 1, we obtain the simpliﬁed
expression W(m) = 1/2.
Figure 1 illustrates the above situation in terms of the
lifetime utility generated by the two proﬁles for m = 10
and T = 20. Proﬁle I starts with the better health state
Qual Life Res (2012) 21:25–34 27
123G and, hence, gives more utility at the beginning than
Proﬁle II. Because this individual discounts future life
years, however, both health states are given less weight
when occurring later in life. Therefore, both curves are
downward sloping. Then, at point m = 10, health in Proﬁle
I deteriorates to B, whereas health in Proﬁle II improves to
G. This is illustrated by the kinks in the curves. They then
continue decreasing smoothly (determined by the individ-
ual’s discounting function) from m = 10 until T = 20. The
subject now in fact compares the areas under these two
curves and chooses the proﬁle that generates the greatest
area or, in other words, gives the highest discounted utility.
We described the health proﬁles in terms of periods of
relief, i.e., for each proﬁle we indicated during which period
the subject was relieved from complaints (and, hence, being
in G) and during which period he was in B. In addition, we
used the age the subject would have at the indicated time
points, since pilot studies suggested this was easier to
imagine for subjects. Figure 2 shows a screenshot of one of
the experimental questions (translated into English).
A difference in the procedure employed in [19] was that
we explicitly gave the amount of time associated with a
particular period with relief, in order to avoid mistakes in
computations by subjects. For example, when a subject had
to choose between relief from age 30 until 40 and relief
from age 40 until age 60, we explicitly indicated that the
relief lasted 10 years in the ﬁrst option and 20 years in the
second option.
TTO procedure
The ﬁrst choice of a TTO iteration was always between
A = ‘‘nb years in b’’ and B = ‘‘nb years in c’’. This was to
test whether subjects indeed preferred living a given period
in c rather than in b. If a subject chose A, we increased the
duration of B to nb ? 1 years in c, so that this option had
both a longer duration and better health state than A. If the
subject still chose A, he went forward to the next iteration
and his results were not analyzed (there were seven of those
subjects, as described below). If he instead chose B,w e
again reduced the duration of B to nb, thereby repeating the
ﬁrst question. If the subject chose A again, his results were
not analyzed. If he chose B, he moved on to the second
question (which the subjects who preferred B already got in
the ﬁrst question). The second option halved the duration of
B to nb. Choosing B then halved this duration again, to
nb, whereas choosing A led to a value halfway between
nb and nb, i.e. nb. The iteration continued in this way
using the bisection method, and an indifference value was
estimated after ﬁve questions. There was no separate pro-
cedure for subjects who regarded the health state as worse
than dead. However, it seems that virtually no subjects had
this preference since for all durations there were no or very
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Fig. 1 Example of the lifetime utilities of two proﬁles
Fig. 2 Screenshot of a question
in the discounting task of the
experiment
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123few occurrences of the lowest possible value, and the health
state was explicitly chosen in such a way as to avoid worse
than dead ratings.
Stimuli
Wechosetheconstanthealthproﬁlesb = B=‘‘regularback
pain’’ and c = G = ‘‘full health’’ throughout the experiment.
The health state ‘‘regular back pain’’ is a common health
state,andsubjectswerelikelytoknowpeoplesufferingfrom
it.Wedescribedthehealthstateusingthedomainscontained
in the EuroQol 5D (EQ-5D) questionnaire. We therefore
indicatedwhatregularbackpainmeantfordailyfunctioning
in terms of ﬁve dimensions (mobility, self-care, usual
activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression). The
descriptions were printed on cards and handed to the par-
ticipants (see ‘‘Appendix 1’’). It was made clear to the
subjects that health proﬁle c meant they were able to func-
tion perfectly on all ﬁve EQ-5D dimensions, irrespective of
their age. The same health states were used in the dis-
counting and TTO parts to avoid distorting inﬂuences of
differentbehaviorfordifferenthealthstates(e.g.,ifdifferent
utility functions existed for different health states).
Stimuli discounting elicitation
We elicited ﬁve points on the utility of life duration func-
tion. First, we elicited x1/2 = W(m) = 1/2 W(T = 50) = 1/
2. Subsequently, x1/8, x1/4, x3/4, and x7/8 were elicited in a
similar fashion, making use of the obtained answers. For
example, x1/4 = W(l) = 1/2 W(T = m) = 1/2*1/2 = 1/4
could be elicited by setting T = m and inferring a value for
l in the same way as for x1/2.
Stimuli TTO elicitation
We used ten different gauge durations in the TTO elicita-
tion process, covering the entire range between 1 and
46 years. The gauge durations chosen were nb = 1, 3, 7,
10, 15, 19, 26, 31, 39, and 46 years. The use of round
numbers might encourage subjects to respond in round
numbers as well, causing a proportional heuristic [10]. We
chose these somewhat odd durations to make this heuristic
less salient [9]. Contrary to most previous studies, we used
short, intermediate, and long gauge durations, enabling a
more complete test of CPTO. The different gauge durations
were asked in randomized order.
Analyses
We classiﬁed subjects as concave or convex depending on
their ﬁve answers to the discounting elicitation questions.
This procedure is explained in ‘‘Appendix 2’’.
The uncorrected TTO scores were computed in the usual
way, i.e., dividing the elicited indifference value (number
of years in full health, nc) by the ﬁxed number of years with
back pain (nb). The elicited utility function for life duration
was used to correct the TTO scores, employing the cor-
recting procedure explained elsewhere [20].
We compared the results for the different gauge dura-
tions by means of the nonparametric Friedman and Wil-
coxon signed ranks tests, since the TTO scores tended to be
skewed to the left for all gauge durations, and a normal
distribution had to be rejected (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test,
P\0.05 for all gauge durations). Regarding conﬂicting
conclusions, we report parametric tests as well.
Results
The data of seven subjects were removed, because they had
difﬁculties in understanding the experiment and did not
indicate preferring more life years to less. As a result, the
data of 76 subjects were included in the analysis (42 [55%]
men).
Subjects always (i.e., in 100% of the questions) pre-
ferred to be in full health instead of living with back pain
when the duration was the same for both, indicating that
back pain was valued less than full health. Consistency
tests were performed in the discounting elicitation part,
yielding a test–retest reliability of 89%.
Discounting
The utility of life duration elicitation resulted mainly in
concavity (or positive discounting of future life years), as
expected (i.e. 244 concave parts versus 127 convex parts,
binomial test: P\0.01). The concavity was, however, less
pronounced than in a previous elicitation by means of the
direct method [19]. Classifying subjects as concave [con-
vex] when they had at least three concave [convex] utility
parts, there were 79% [21%] concave [convex] subjects in
the present analysis, compared to 88% [12%] in [19]. This
was probably caused by the fact that we explicitly stated
the number of years corresponding to particular periods in
terms of age, which may have led subjects to equalize the
differences and, hence, to show more linear behavior than
in the experiment of Attema et al. [19]. Figure 3 shows the
utility function for the medians of the elicited life years.
TTO
Figures 4 and 5 show error bars for the TTO scores elicited
with the different gauge durations, for the uncorrected and
corrected TTO scores, respectively. Because the majority
of the subjects exhibited positive discounting, the mean
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scores. The corrected scores were signiﬁcantly higher than
the uncorrected scores for all gauge durations above 1 year
according to the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (P\0.01
except for nb = 1[ P = 0.32]) and were signiﬁcantly
higher for all durations above 3 years according to the
paired t test (P\0.01 except for nb = 1[ P = 0.32] and
nb = 3[ P = 0.06]). Interestingly, correcting for dis-
counting decreased the variance for all gauge durations.
This seems to be an important result in light of the ﬁndings
of high variability of TTO data [21].
We could not accept the hypothesis that gauge duration
does not matter for TTO scores (Friedman test, P\0.01),
rejecting the CPTO assumption. Moreover, neither the
hypothesis of a negative relationship between TTO scores
and gauge duration nor the hypothesis of a U shaped
relation was supported by the data. Correcting for utility of
life duration decreased the magnitude of this alternation
somewhat (see Fig. 5), but the conclusion did not change
and the hypothesis of generalized CPTO was rejected as
well (Friedman test, P\0.01). There tended to be an
upward trend for corrected TTO scores, i.e., lower pro-
portions of total utility were traded off to regain full health
for longer gauge durations. On the other hand, in absolute
terms, the differences in mean TTO scores for the different
gauge durations were fairly small. This can also be seen
from Fig. 4, with most conﬁdence intervals actually
overlapping.
We also performed tests of CPTO at shorter intervals.
Table 1 gives an overview of these tests, showing that
CPTO could not be rejected for all adjacent gauge dura-
tions. In particular, we found no signiﬁcant difference for
intermediate gauge durations (nb = 15-19-26). In addition,
when using an ANOVA test for corrected scores, no sig-
niﬁcant difference for the intermediate and long durations
(nb = 15-19-26-31-39-46) was found (P = 0.20, although
when using a Friedman test the difference was signiﬁcant,
P\0.01). These ﬁndings provide an explanation for why
some previous studies could not reject CPTO. Those
studies might have considered a subset of gauge durations
for which CPTO held true; whereas, it might not have been
valid when they would have included a broader set of
gauge durations.
Three results in particular deserve further attention.
First, the 1 year gauge duration resulted in quite low TTO
scores. This is contrary to the prevailing assertion that TTO
scores tend to be higher for short durations, since people
seem to be reluctant to give up lifetime when their life
expectancy is very low. Second, there were some remark-
able drops in TTO scores for the gauge durations
nb = 10,26,39. Third, the number of years sacriﬁced did
not monotonically increase with gauge duration.
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123It seems that heuristics have inﬂuenced the answers of a
substantial part of the subjects. In particular, after analyzing
the revealed number of life years in full health that was
considered equivalent to the stated number of life years with
back pain (see Table 2), we found the following peculiari-
ties. Subjects seemed to focus on multiples of ten when
making choices for the longer durations. For nb = 46, they
had a tendency to choose values around 30 and 40 years in
full health. Similarly, they were inclined to choose 20 and
30 yearsmoreoftenfornb = 39andtochoosevaluesaround
20 years for nb = 26. For nb = 31, subjects tended to take
30 as a reference point and seemed to be willing to sacriﬁce
about 5 years, whereas many were willing to give up only
2 years for nb = 19. These heuristics could explain the drop
in TTO scores at 26 and 39 years. Furthermore, the will-
ingness to give up no more than around 2.5 years held for
nb = 10andnb = 15aswell,explainingtheincreaseinTTO
scores when the gauge duration rose from 10 years toward
19 years. Thus, the absolute level of sacriﬁced years may
have played a role here to some extent irrespective of gauge
duration. Finally, for the durations shorter than 10 years,
many subjects just wanted to give up the lowest possible
amount, although there was more variability in the answers
here causing the TTO scores not to be higher than for the
longer durations.
Conclusions
Recapitulating, this study has added to the evidence against
the conventional QALY model. The CPTO condition was
rejected, although the magnitude of the violation was
modest and the speciﬁc TTO procedure used may, because
of particular heuristics, have contributed to the violations.
Correcting for discounting did not change this conclusion,
so that the generalized CPTO condition was rejected as
well. The correction for discounting did have other effects,
though, since the TTO scores were signiﬁcantly increased
and variability in TTO scores decreased for all gauge
durations after correcting for discounting.
Furthermore, no decreasing, increasing, U shaped, or
any other clear relationship between gauge duration and
TTO score was observed. We instead found an alternating
pattern that was seemingly caused by anchoring heuristics.
In addition, when comparing only subsets of the included
gauge durations, CPTO was not always rejected, providing
a possible explanation for the support for CPTO in previ-
ous empirical work. The use of long time horizons might
have caused MET to become important [10, 11, 22].
However, the lack of a negative relationship between TTO
scores and gauge duration suggests that the mild health
state we used was not considered sufﬁciently serious to
become worse than dead after some time.
Another, thus far neglected, phenomenon may inﬂuence
TTO scores as well, i.e., the elicitation mode by which
subjects reveal their indifference between two options.
Many TTO studies have used some version of an open-
ended, or ‘‘matching’’, elicitation mode to elicit TTO
scores, where subjects had to give a number of years in full
health that made them indifferent to the stated number of
years in an imperfect health state. Instead, we used a choice
task to better approximate the choice-based nature of
economic practice. Our results suggest that loss aversion
for short durations is far less important for choice tasks
than matching tasks, in accordance with other studies [9,
23]. In particular, the shortest durations (nb = 1,3,7) did
not yield higher TTO scores than the other durations,
suggesting that a choice based design causes subjects to put
Table 1 P values Friedman and ANOVA tests
Test Friedman uncorrected Friedman corrected ANOVA uncorrected ANOVA corrected
Durations
All gauge durations \0.01 \0.01 0.02 \0.01
1–3–7 \0.01 \0.01 0.04 0.02
3–7–10 \0.01 \0.01 0.08 0.05
7–10–15 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.20
10–15–19 \0.01 \0.01 0.28 0.09
15–19–26 0.12 0.19 0.31 0.39
19–26–31 \0.01 \0.01 0.18 0.12
26–31–39 \0.01 \0.01 0.03 0.09
31–39–46 \0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08
15–19–26–31 0.02 \0.01 0.31 0.18
3–7–15–19–26–39–46 \0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05
15–19–26–31–39–46 \0.01 \0.01 0.04 0.20
15–19–26–39–46 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.42
Qual Life Res (2012) 21:25–34 31
123less emphasis on the maximization of remaining lifetime.
More research in this area seems warranted.
For a number of gauge durations, subjects tended to
take some focal point (usually a multiple of ten) as
their anchor and provided an answer close to that
anchor. This anchoring heuristic offers an explanation
for the alternating relationship between TTO scores and
duration. Moreover, the heuristic is not a particularity
of the choice design, since Attema and Brouwer [20]
used a matching design and found a similar focus on 10
multiples. Other studies using longer gauge durations
did not report information about individual responses,
so we do not know whether these studies also found
such a heuristic. Still, our ﬁndings highlight the con-
structive nature of health state valuation tasks, causing
contextual effects to have a substantial inﬂuence on the
elicited utilities. How to best avoid these heuristics is
an open question.
Table 2 Distribution of the answers
nb = 1 nb = 3 nb = 7 nb = 10 nb = 15
Possible
answers
Frequency Possible
answers
Frequency Possible
answers
Frequency Possible
answers
Frequency Possible
answers
Frequency
0.03 5 0.1 2 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.5 0
0.08 1 0.3 0 0.65 0 0.8 2 1.5 0
0.13 0 0.5 0 1.15 0 1.2 0 2.5 0
0.18 1 0.7 4 1.6 0 1.8 0 3.5 0
0.25 0 0.9 0 2 1 2.5 0 4.5 0
0.35 4 1.1 2 2.4 0 3.5 0 5.5 0
0.43 3 1.3 2 2.8 0 4.2 2 6.5 3
0.48 7 1.4 4 3.25 4 4.8 3 7.5 8
0.53 0 1.6 4 3.75 4 5.2 1 8.5 1
0.58 1 1.7 1 4.2 4 5.8 5 9.5 7
0.65 5 1.9 5 4.6 2 6.5 11 10.5 3
0.75 6 2.1 7 5 5 7.5 18 11.5 12
0.825 7 2.3 5 5.4 3 8.2 2 12.5 7
0.875 6 2.5 5 5.85 20 8.8 13 13.5 22
0.925 7 2.7 10 6.35 13 9.2 8 14.25 4
0.975 23 2.9 25 6.8 20 9.8 11 14.75 9
nb = 19 nb = 26 nb = 31 nb = 39 nb = 46
Possible
answers
Frequency Possible
answers
Frequency Possible
answers
Frequency Possible
answers
Frequency Possible
answers
Frequency
0.5 0 1 3 1 0 1 2 1.5 0
1.5 0 2.5 0 3 0 3.5 0 4.5 0
3 0 3.5 0 5 0 6.5 0 7.5 0
4.5 0 5 0 7 1 9 0 10.5 0
5.5 0 7 0 9 0 11 0 13.5 1
7 1 9 0 11 0 13.5 4 16.5 2
8.5 1 11 0 13 2 16.5 3 19 2
9.5 6 12.5 4 15 3 19 13 21.5 5
10.5 2 13.5 2 17 3 21 0 24.5 3
11.5 3 15 5 19 4 23.5 0 27 2
12.5 4 17 3 21 4 26.5 3 29.5 8
13.5 3 19 16 23 3 29 13 32.5 4
14.5 7 21 8 25 10 31 1 35.5 5
15.5 7 22.5 17 27 24 33 14 38.5 17
17 30 23.5 5 29 14 35 9 41.5 20
18.5 12 25 13 30.5 8 37.5 14 44.5 7
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123One can question how much violation is a problem for
using TTO and, as a result, the application of the QALY
modelingeneral.Onemayconsiderthevariationobservedin
thisstudytoberelativelysmall,asrangingfrom0.72to0.81.
The lack of any overall pattern combined with some com-
putationalerrors maythereforebetakentosuggest nostrong
departure from the QALY model. On the other hand, one
may consider a variation of some 12.5% to be substantial.
Moreover,itseemsimportanttoconsiderthattheviolationof
CPTO may be more pronounced for other health states and
related to the elicitation procedure used. Therefore, more
research addressing these matters appears warranted.
A limitation of the current study is that we considered a
student population and, hence, we could not generalize our
ﬁndings to the general population. For example, age and
marital status may inﬂuence discounting and health state
values [24], suggesting that results may be different when
interviewing older or married individuals. Moreover, short
durations, i.e., life expectancies (such as of 1 year), may be
difﬁcult to realistically consider for young individuals. On
the other hand, this sample did allow long time horizons to
be used in our study. Another limitation may be that some
students might not have been able to understand the nature
of the principal health condition (i.e., back pain). Also,
looking at only one disease state limited generalizability.
Therefore, future studies should investigate a sample rep-
resentative for the general population and include more
than one health state. Finally, we used the direct method
to correct for discounting, which may have particular
features, e.g., that people may value descending over
ascending sequences. Comparing this method to other
measures of discounting is therefore important.
To conclude, our results are mixed evidence for the TTO
method and the QALY model. CPTO was violated both for
the usual deﬁnition and for a more generalized deﬁnition,
with a variation between 0.72 and 0.81, which suggests that
health quality and life duration are mutually dependent.
Time preferences and heuristics are important determinants
of the answers in TTO valuations, causing TTO scores to
be inﬂuenced by contextual factors, like answering format
(open-ended or close-ended) and availability of anchoring
points. A policy implication of this study may therefore be
that researchers can only compare results from using the
same TTO variant, which includes anchor, elicitation pro-
cedure, and duration [25].
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Appendix 1: Health state descriptions (translated)
Card 1: regular back pain
You have regular back pain. This has the following con-
sequences for your functioning in daily life:
• You have no problems in walking about.
• You have no problems to wash or dress yourself.
• You have some problems with your usual activities.
• You have moderate pain or other discomfort.
• You are not anxious or depressed.
Card 2: full health
You have no complaints and are in full health. This has the
following consequences for your functioning in daily life:
• You have no problems in walking about.
• You have no problems to wash or dress yourself.
• You have no problems with your usual activities.
• You have no pain or other discomfort.
• You are not anxious or depressed.
Appendix 2: Classiﬁcation of the utility
for life duration function
Classiﬁcation as concave or convex was done by comput-
ing the differences between 2 successive elements of the
elicited time points and dividing these by their respective
utility of life duration increase (this division was necessary
since the utility difference between two successive elicited
values could be either 1/8 or 1/4):
Dt ¼
xi   xi 1
W½xi 1;xi 
i ¼ 1;...6; ð3Þ
where x1 represents x1/8, xi represents x1/4, etc.
Subsequently, we computed:
oi ¼ Di   Di 1 i ¼ 2;...6; ð4Þ
i.e., how much successive outcome intervals increase or
decrease per utility unit. For each subject, we observed 5
values of qi. A positive [negative, zero] value of qi corre-
sponds to a concave [convex, linear] part of the utility
function (i.e., positive [negative, zero] discounting) [20].
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